When Clinical Care Becomes a Life-or-Death Judgment

by | Nov 19, 2026

In an episode of The Gaslit Truth, I returned to a question that resists easy answers: what happens when mental health professionals are asked to assess both suicide risk and eligibility for medically assisted dying?

The issue is not simply whether a person should have autonomy over end-of-life decisions. It is also about professional power, legal exposure, diagnostic uncertainty, and the limits of what any clinician can honestly know about another person’s future suffering.

What has stayed with me is the double bind. In ordinary clinical practice, a therapist may be expected to intervene when a person appears at risk of self-harm. In other legal and medical contexts, mental health assessment may be part of a process examining a person’s capacity to make an end-of-life decision. These are not identical circumstances, but they can place clinicians near the same profound question: who has authority to decide when a life is no longer bearable?

The burden hidden inside risk assessment

Mental health professionals are regularly asked to make judgments under uncertainty. Risk assessments can identify known factors, immediate circumstances, stated intent, access to means, support systems, and changes in functioning. Those are meaningful data points. They are not a crystal ball.

I keep coming back to the difference between assessment and prediction. Assessment is a structured effort to understand risk in the present. Prediction implies that a clinician can reliably know what a person will do days, weeks, or years from now. Those are not the same task, yet liability systems can blur the distinction.

When a clinician fears professional discipline, litigation, or scrutiny after a death, defensive decision-making becomes understandable. That does not mean every intervention is wrong or that safety planning lacks value. It means we should be candid about the pressures shaping clinical judgment. A decision can be motivated by care, ethical duty, institutional policy, and liability concerns at the same time.

That complexity matters because it challenges the comforting idea that the clinician’s role is purely neutral. Professionals work within systems. Systems define documentation requirements, emergency procedures, reporting obligations, and the consequences of being judged to have missed a risk signal.

For readers trying to understand these pressures, my professional background and approach may offer helpful context. My work sits at the intersection of psychology, brain health, cognitive performance, and difficult health-care decisions. I am interested in how people make judgments when certainty is unavailable but the stakes are high.

Autonomy is not a simple yes-or-no principle

It would be simplistic to frame this as autonomy on one side and intervention on the other. Personal agency matters. So do coercion, untreated pain, social isolation, poverty, family pressure, disability discrimination, inadequate care, and the possibility that a person’s options have narrowed because systems failed them.

A request to die can never be understood outside its conditions. Is suffering being accurately recognized? Are practical supports accessible? Has the person been given meaningful information about alternatives? Is their decision stable over time? Are there external pressures that make death seem like the only remaining option?

These questions do not erase autonomy. They are part of respecting it. Consent is not merely a signature or an expression of preference. It requires decision-making capacity, usable information, freedom from undue pressure, and real alternatives. In my view, decision integrity is a more useful frame than reflexively choosing either paternalism or unrestricted autonomy.

The problem with treating psychiatric prognosis as settled

The conversation also sharpened a concern I have about language such as permanent, terminal, or treatment exhausted when it is applied to psychiatric suffering. People can experience severe, enduring distress. That reality should not be minimized. But the lived severity of suffering does not automatically establish certainty about prognosis.

Psychiatric categories are often treated in public discourse as if they provide precise biological forecasts for an individual person. They do not function that way. A diagnosis may describe a pattern of symptoms and impairment, but it cannot, on its own, determine the full course of a person’s life or establish that improvement is impossible.

That uncertainty becomes even more important when treatment history enters the discussion. A long treatment record may be interpreted as proof that nothing can help. Yet the existence of many previous interventions does not tell us enough by itself. We would need to understand the quality of those interventions, their effects, harms, context, informed-consent process, and the person’s own goals.

This is one reason I encourage more careful thinking around psychiatric medication and deprescribing decisions. Medication experiences can be beneficial, neutral, harmful, or difficult to interpret, particularly over long periods. No single narrative should be imposed on a person’s suffering, including the narrative that more treatment is always the answer or that prior treatment history definitively predicts the future.

Suicidality and end-of-life decision-making cannot be collapsed

Another distinction deserves care. Suicidality is not one uniform experience. A person may want unbearable pain, fear, agitation, humiliation, or physical suffering to stop. That is different from a settled wish to cease existing, and both can shift over time. The conversation explored how quickly clinicians can be required to act when risk is perceived, often with incomplete information.

Medically assisted dying also involves questions that cannot be reduced to a standard suicide-risk protocol. Legal criteria, medical prognosis, capacity, consent, physical illness, and procedural safeguards may all be relevant depending on the jurisdiction. Conflating every request for death with psychiatric crisis can obscure the reality of serious medical suffering. Treating every expression of suicidality as a fully autonomous and settled decision can obscure the possibility of change, ambivalence, and treatable contributors to distress.

Good judgment requires holding both truths without pretending the tension disappears.

Why clinician humility matters

I do not think the answer is to place even more impossible authority on clinicians. Nor is it to deny that they have responsibilities when someone is in immediate danger. The more honest position is humility: clinicians can gather information, identify risk, ask better questions, document reasoning, support deliberation, and help connect people to care. They cannot responsibly claim certainty about a person’s future, the meaning of suffering, or the exact moral value of another person’s life.

That humility is also central to brain health. Human judgment changes under pain, sleep disruption, trauma, medication effects, neurological illness, grief, fear, and acute stress. Recognizing these influences should make us more rigorous about decision-making, not more dismissive of the person living through them.

The long-term question is not whether medicine, law, or mental health can produce a flawless answer to assisted dying. They cannot. The question is whether we can build processes that acknowledge uncertainty without abandoning compassion, autonomy without ignoring conditions, and professional responsibility without pretending clinicians are equipped to predict the future. Decision integrity begins there: with intellectual honesty about what we know, what we do not know, and what no one person should be asked to decide alone.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Teralyn Sell, PhD

Dr. Teralyn Sell is a brain health and cognitive performance expert, psychotherapist, and author whose work examines psychiatric medication decision-making, informed consent, and long-term human functioning.

EXPLORE HER PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND →